

2006

شكر وتقدير

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122

2006

(1831)

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Abstract

The effect of materialistic and non-materialistic motives on the worker's performance at Saudi tele- communication in the kingdom of saudia Arabia

Ali Saleh Al-Balawi

Mu'tah University, 2006

This study aimed at identifying the effects of the materialistic and non-materialistic on the performance of the workers at Saudi communication company . In order to achieve the study finding a questionnaire was designed and the sample which contained (1831) Persons was chosen randomly .

The findings of the research were as follow :

1- the materialistic and non – materialistic variable was in the mid beside their wishes to be improved in the future . Also the positive and negative motives which was done by the company were high , besides the undivided and group motives were also high .

2- Implementing the materialistic and non-materialistic motives leads to improve the worker's performance.

The study recommends to focus on the different forms and dimensions of the materialistic and non-materialistic interns of its roles and importance in the organizations and reinforcing its non-materialistic gains .

So as to reinforce the materialistic gains , which lead to and improved performance loyalty .

Sub systems – ... Institutional Evaluation- ...

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1 . 4 [illegible]:

[illegible]

1- [illegible]

2- [illegible]

3- [illegible]

4- [illegible].

5- [illegible].

6- [illegible].

1. 5 [illegible]:

[illegible]:

[illegible]: [illegible] $(\alpha \leq 0.05)$ [illegible].

[illegible]: [illegible] $(\alpha \leq 0.05)$ [illegible]

$(\alpha \leq 0.05)$

$(\alpha \leq 0.05)$

1.2

Indicators

(Schermerhorn ,& et,al .2000:118)

(Byors & Rue , 1997 : 316)

(Robbins , 2001: 22)

(Luthans, 1992: 114)

[illegible]

[illegible] .(84 [illegible] 1990 [illegible]

[illegible] .(161 :2002 [illegible])

[illegible] .(13 : 1999 [illegible])

[illegible] .(22: 1999 [illegible])

[illegible] .(342: 2002 [illegible])

[illegible] .(86: 2003 [illegible])

[illegible] (2005 [illegible])

[illegible]

[illegible]:

[illegible]

.(Ostroff , 1992 :963 – 674

(Brown & Coulter,1983,: 50-58)

.(Narendar, 2006 :143

. (85: 1999

: (Caciioppe 1999:321)

1

. (16 :1999

[illegible]

. (24 :1999 [illegible] 16 :1998 [illegible] 8 :2002 [illegible]

(System Theory) [illegible]

[illegible] (Modern Management Trends [illegible] (Open System) [illegible] (Sub-System) [illegible]

[illegible]

.(26 :2003 [illegible]

: Expectance Theory [illegible]

[illegible]

1. [illegible]
2. [illegible]
3. [illegible] :2003 [illegible] (130- 129

[illegible]

[illegible]

1. [illegible]
2. [illegible]

[illegible]

1. [illegible]
2. [illegible]
3. [illegible]
4. [illegible]
5. [illegible]
6. [illegible] .([illegible] 1999: 25 [illegible] 2000: 123 [illegible] 2003 : 137).

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[illegible]


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2. [illegible]

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(183- 282 :2004




(1)

(1998)

17

(2001



(2)

(41 :2001

:"ERG"(Existence Relatedness Growth

(Growth) (Relatedness) (Existence)


" Clayton P. Alderfer "

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2. [illegible]

3. [illegible] .(17 : 1990 [illegible])



(3) [illegible]

[illegible] (2004) [illegible] .296 [illegible]

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
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[illegible]

.(119 – 118 :2003 [illegible])

[illegible] (4) [illegible]:



(4) [illegible]

[illegible]

[illegible] (2002) [illegible]

.350 [illegible]

[illegible]

1. [illegible]

[illegible] .2

(359 :2002 [illegible]) . [illegible]

[illegible] :

[illegible]

[illegible]

[illegible]

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: [illegible]

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
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3. [illegible]
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[illegible] 7 :1997 [illegible])
.(George &Jones,1999,p:191 [illegible] 5 :2001 [illegible] 128- 2003:127

:(Two – Factor Theory) [illegible]

[illegible]

.(24 :1999 [illegible]



(5) [illegible]

[illegible]

[illegible] (2002) [illegible] .256

(Y) [illegible]

[illegible] (Y) [illegible] (X) [illegible]

[illegible]

[illegible]

.(114 :2003 [illegible]

:[illegible] (X) [illegible]

1. [illegible]
2. [illegible]
3. [illegible] (22-21 :2004 [illegible]

:[illegible] (Y) [illegible]

1. [illegible]
2. [illegible]
3. [illegible]
4. [illegible]
5. [illegible]

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(261-260 :2001

: (Z)

. (262-261 :2001


. (299-298 :2004

[illegible]

1. [illegible]

2. [illegible]

3. [illegible]



(6) [illegible]

[illegible]

[illegible] (2005) [illegible] 63 [illegible]

[illegible]

.(400 :2002

[illegible] :(Goal Setting Theory)

[illegible] . (125- 124 :2003 [illegible]

[illegible]

1. [illegible]
2. [illegible]
3. [illegible]
4. [illegible]

(134 :2000 [illegible]) [illegible]

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[illegible]


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2. [illegible]


3. [illegible]

4. [illegible] (298-297 :2004 [illegible]) (9 :1998 [illegible])



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.2



(8)

(2004) .295

(Content Theory)

[illegible]

(2001 [illegible]


(Path Theory) [illegible]

[illegible]

(2001 [illegible]

[illegible]

Theory X and Theory y – (y) (X)



- 1

(30 :1986

- 2

. (58: 2005

.(1998

.(Rowden & others,2005)

.(Abendschein, 2004)

.(Abendschein, 2004)

12


(2003 ... Okpara et al, 2005 Kelly,1994 ... 1993 : ... 2003 : ...)

.(Robbins , 2001)

.(Valle & Witt, 2001:381)

Beardwell and Hassard, 1991 2003

.(Dutti, 1988 Holden , 2001 , P.304 – 305 Testa, 2001



(10)

(2005) .52

.(110- 109 1998)

.(55 :1997)

.(2001

. (65-63 :2005 [illegible]) [illegible]

[illegible]

1. [illegible]

2.

55: 1997 ، 360 ،

(38 :1999 ، 27 :1986 ، 343 :2002

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.(Testa , 2001 :228)

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:2005

.(23 :2005

.1

[illegible]
:2001 [illegible]
(33

.2 [illegible]
[illegible]
[illegible]
Valle and [illegible]
.(Witt , 2001: 379

.3 [illegible]
[illegible]

.4 [illegible]

.5 [illegible]
[illegible]

.6 [illegible]

.7 [illegible]

[illegible]:

1 - [illegible]
.(39 :2003 [illegible]

2 - [illegible]
[illegible]

3 - [illegible]
[illegible]

4 - [illegible]

5 - [illegible]

6 - [illegible].

7 - [illegible].

8 - [illegible].

[illegible] (33 :2004 [illegible]) :

1 - [illegible].

2 - [illegible].

3 - [illegible].

[illegible]:

[illegible]:

1. [illegible].
2. [illegible] (1993 [illegible]).
3. [illegible]
4. [illegible] :2005 [illegible] (26).
5. [illegible]
6. [illegible]
7. [illegible] (8 :2001 [illegible]).
8. [illegible].
9. [illegible].
10. [illegible].

11. [illegible].
12. [illegible].
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15. [illegible].
16. [illegible] [illegible] (37 :2002).
17. [illegible].
18. [illegible].
19. [illegible].
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23. [illegible].
24. [illegible].
25. [illegible].
26. [illegible].
27. [illegible].

.28 [illegible]

.29 [illegible]
[illegible] 1998: 40).

[illegible] (Job Performance):

[illegible]
.(1994

[illegible] (2002 [illegible]
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[illegible] : 2001 [illegible] .(169

[illegible] (Ubom, 2001:98) [illegible]

[illegible] (5 :2002 [illegible]

[illegible]

[illegible]

[illegible] .(2000 [illegible])

[illegible] :

1- [illegible] .(17- 16: 2003 [illegible])

2- [illegible] .(Shan-Kou ,2005:114)

3- [illegible] (Empowering Employees) [illegible] . (Kennedy , 1995 : 793-811)

4- [illegible] (Trust) [illegible] (Bavon,1995:491-519)

. (Taylor et al , 1995 : 6)

.(102 :2002

.(4 :1992

.(59 1999

(26 2005

[illegible]

[illegible]

[illegible]

[illegible]

[illegible]

[illegible]

[illegible]

[illegible]:

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[illegible] (9 :1995 [illegible]).

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[illegible]

[illegible] (Tapinos, 2005):

[illegible]

[illegible]

[illegible]

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[illegible] . (2005 [illegible])

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[illegible] : (349-348 :2002 [illegible])

1. [illegible] .
2. [illegible] .
3. [illegible] .
4. [illegible] .

(1993

(19)

313

(Gabbert,2005)

(154)

[illegible]

[illegible] (Ubom& Joshua,2004) [illegible]

[illegible] (Kleemann & Matuschek,2002) [illegible]

[illegible]

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(1) [illegible]

[illegible]

[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]
%6.6	120	[illegible]	[illegible]
%11.2	205	[illegible]	
%23.2	424	[illegible]	
% 59.1	1082	[illegible]	
%15.2	279	[illegible] 5	[illegible]
%36.2	663	[illegible] 10-6	
%21.8	399	[illegible] 15-11	
% 26.8	490	[illegible] 16	
%13.9	254	[illegible]	[illegible]
% 86.1	1577	[illegible]	
%39.5	723	[illegible]	[illegible]
%51.2	938	[illegible]	
% 9.3	170	[illegible]	
%25.3	463	[illegible] 30	[illegible]
%48.0	879	[illegible] 40-31	
%18.2	334	[illegible] 50-41	
% 8.5	155	[illegible] 51	
%10.2	186	[illegible] 6000	[illegible]
%43.8	802	9000-6001	
%37.7	691	16000-9001	
% 8.3	152	[illegible] 16000 [illegible]	

[illegible] (1) [illegible] (%59.1) [illegible] (%23.2) [illegible] (%6.6) [illegible] (%11.2) [illegible]

[illegible].

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[illegible] %86.1) [illegible] %13.9) [illegible].

[illegible] %39.5) [illegible] %51.2) [illegible] (%9.3) [illegible].

[illegible] 10-6) [illegible] 16) [illegible] (%36.2) [illegible] %21.8) [illegible] (15-11) [illegible] (%26.8) [illegible] %15.2) [illegible] 5) [illegible].

9000-6001) [illegible] 16000-9001) [illegible] (%43.8) [illegible] 6000) [illegible] %37.7) [illegible] 16000 [illegible] %10.2) [illegible] %8.3).

4.3 [illegible]

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[illegible] :

- [illegible] : [illegible]
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- [illegible] : [illegible] (11) [illegible] .(Alutto, 1986) [illegible] (1-5) [illegible] (1) [illegible] (5) [illegible] .([illegible] (2) [illegible].

(2) [illegible]

[illegible]

الفقرات	[illegible]	[illegible]
11-1	[illegible]	[illegible]
26- 12	[illegible]	
40- 27	[illegible]	
52- 41	[illegible]	
63- 53	[illegible]	[illegible]

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[illegible] (5) [illegible]

[illegible]

[illegible] 6.3

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[illegible] (3) [illegible]

(3) [illegible]

[illegible]

[illegible] ([illegible])	[illegible]	[illegible]
0.9399	([illegible]) [illegible]	63- 1
0.9135	[illegible]	11-1
0.8942	[illegible]	26- 12
0.8649	[illegible]	40- 27
0.8669	[illegible]	52- 41
0.9022	[illegible]	63- 53

[illegible] (3) [illegible]

[illegible] (%93.99) [illegible]

7.3 [illegible] :

[illegible]

[illegible] :

1- [illegible] (Descriptive Statistic Measures) [illegible]

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[illegible]

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2- [illegible]


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3- [illegible] (Multiple Regression Analysis) [illegible]

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4- [illegible] (ANOVA) [illegible]

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(11)

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[illegible] (1995 [illegible]).

[illegible] (Rowden & others,2005).

[illegible] (1993).

[illegible] (Okpara et al,2005).

[illegible]

[illegible]

.(1995

.(Robbins , 2001: 82

.(29:2005

.(2003

.(Montes et al, 2004)

.(2004

[illegible]

[illegible]

[illegible] 1.4

[illegible]

:[illegible]

[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	تنطبق دائما
1	2	3	4	5

[illegible]

:[illegible]

[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]
[illegible] 2.49	3.49 - 2.50 [illegible]	[illegible] 3.50

[illegible] (3.50) [illegible] (3.49 - 2.50) [illegible] ([illegible] 2.49) [illegible].

[illegible]

(4) [illegible]

[illegible]

[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]
[illegible]	11	%51.80	0.87	2,59	[illegible]	.1
[illegible]	4	%57.80	0.91	2,89	[illegible]	.2
[illegible]	9	%56.00	0.82	2,80	[illegible]	.3
[illegible]	6	%57.40	0.88	2,87	[illegible]	.4
[illegible]	10	%52.20	0.79	2,61	[illegible]	.5
[illegible]	8	%56.40	0.73	2,82	[illegible]	.6
[illegible]	5	%57.60	0.84	2,88	[illegible]	.7
[illegible]	2	%58.40	0.85	2,92	[illegible]	.8
[illegible]	7	%56.60	0.69	2,83	[illegible]	.9
[illegible]	3	%58.00	0.74	2,90	[illegible]	.10
[illegible]	1	%58.60	0.93	2,93	[illegible]	.11
[illegible]	-	%56.60	0.51	2,83	[illegible]	11-1

[illegible] (4)[illegible]

[illegible]

[illegible]

(5) [illegible]

[illegible]

.[illegible]

[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]
[illegible]	1	%76.26	0.92	3.81	[illegible]	.1
[illegible]	7	%71.84	0.94	3.59	[illegible]	.2
[illegible]	2	%75.10	0.92	3.75	[illegible]	.3
[illegible]	4	%74.19	0.98	3.71	[illegible]	.4
[illegible]	8	%70.17	0.89	3.51	[illegible]	.5
[illegible]	3	%74.88	0.87	3.74	[illegible]	.6
[illegible]	6	%73.10	0.88	3.65	[illegible]	.7
[illegible]	15	%51.63	0.79	2.58	[illegible]	.8
[illegible]	5	%73.30	0.94	3.67	[illegible]	.9
[illegible]	9	%68.72	0.97	3.44	[illegible]	.10
[illegible]	12	%60.33	0.93	3.02	[illegible]	.11
[illegible]	14	%52.69	0.96	2.63	[illegible]	.12
[illegible]	11	%61.28	1.28	3.06	[illegible]	.13
[illegible]	13	%57.49	0.89	2.87	[illegible]	.14
[illegible]	10	%64.39	0.91	3.22	[illegible]	.15
[illegible]	-	%67.00	0.54	3.35	[illegible]	15- 1

[illegible] (5) [illegible]

[illegible]

[illegible]

(6) [illegible]

[illegible]

[illegible]

[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]
[illegible]	6	%77.71	1.01	3.89	[illegible]	.1
[illegible]	10	%70.69	0.95	3.53	[illegible]	.2
[illegible]	3	%85.66	0.97	4.28	[illegible]	.3
[illegible]	1	%86.68	0.80	4.33	[illegible]	.4
[illegible]	2	%86.44	0.94	4.32	[illegible]	.5
[illegible]	14	%57.02	0.95	2.85	[illegible]	.6
[illegible]	7	%76.40	0.97	3.82	[illegible]	.7
[illegible]	4	%82.85	0.91	4.14	[illegible]	.8
[illegible]	9	%74.69	0.96	3.73	[illegible]	.9
[illegible]	13	%59.84	0.94	2.99	[illegible]	.10
[illegible]	11	%65.97	0.99	3.30	[illegible]	.11
[illegible]	8	%76.00	0.98	3.80	[illegible]	.12
[illegible]	5	%80.80	0.69	4.04	[illegible]	.13
[illegible]	12	%61.08	0.98	3.05	[illegible]	.14
[illegible]	-	%74.42	0.75	3.72	[illegible]	14-1

[illegible] (6) [illegible]

[illegible]

74.42) [illegible] (3.72) [illegible]

[illegible] (%

[illegible] 4) [illegible] (6) [illegible]

[illegible]

[illegible] (4.33) [illegible]

[illegible] (5) [illegible] (%86.68)

(4.32) [illegible]

(3) [illegible] (%86.44) [illegible]

[illegible] (4.28) [illegible]

[illegible] (8) [illegible] (%85.66) [illegible]

[illegible]

[illegible] (%82.85) [illegible] (4.14) [illegible]

[illegible] (13) [illegible]

(%80.80) [illegible] (4.04) [illegible]

[illegible] (6) [illegible]

[illegible]

[illegible] (2.85) [illegible]

[illegible] (%57.02)

[illegible]

(7) [illegible]

[illegible]

[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]
[illegible]	1	%87.15	0.93	4.36	[illegible]	.1
[illegible]	2	%82.38	0.91	4.12	[illegible]	.2
[illegible]	8	%74.49	0.98	3.72	[illegible]	.3
[illegible]	11	%55.54	0.95	2.78	[illegible]	.4
[illegible]	9	%67.33	0.89	3.37	[illegible]	.5
[illegible]	3	%80.96	0.93	4.05	[illegible]	.6
[illegible]	7	%76.06	1.01	3.80	[illegible]	.7
[illegible]	6	%76.78	1.08	3.84	[illegible]	.8
[illegible]	5	%77.51	1.04	3.88	[illegible]	.9
[illegible]	4	%79.02	0.99	3.95	[illegible]	.10
[illegible]	10	%59.29	0.91	2.96	[illegible]	.11
[illegible]	12	%51.97	0.88	2.60	[illegible]	.12
[illegible]	-	%72.37	0.56	3.62	[illegible]	12-1

[illegible] (7) [illegible]

[illegible]

(8) [illegible]

[illegible]

[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]
[illegible]	6	%79.20	0.83	3.96	[illegible]	.1
[illegible]	3	%83.80	0.89	4.19	[illegible]	.2
[illegible]	8	%76.40	0.82	3.82	[illegible]	.3
[illegible]	1	%90.80	0.86	4.54	[illegible]	.4
[illegible]	4	%80.60	0.85	4.03	[illegible]	.5
[illegible]	5	%80.20	0.91	4.01	[illegible]	.6
[illegible]	7	%76.60	0.94	3.83	[illegible]	.7
[illegible]	9	%74.80	0.97	3.74	[illegible]	.8
[illegible]	2	%90.20	0.79	4.51	[illegible]	.9
[illegible]	10	%74.40	0.92	3.72	[illegible]	.10
[illegible]	11	%62.40	0.87	3.12	[illegible]	.11
[illegible]	-	%79.00	0.59	3.95	[illegible]	11-1

[illegible] (8) [illegible] (%79) [illegible] (3.95) [illegible]

[illegible]

(9) [illegible]

[illegible]

[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]
*0.000	0.590	[illegible]	[illegible]
*0.000	0.566	[illegible]	
*0.000	0.493	[illegible]	
*0.000	0.562	[illegible]	
*0.000	0.616	[illegible]	
*0.000	0.306	[illegible]	[illegible]
*0.000	0.428	[illegible]	
*0.000	0.450	[illegible]	
*0.000	0.345	[illegible]	
*0.000	0.211	[illegible]	
*0.000	0.456	[illegible]	
*0.000	0.465	[illegible]	

[illegible] $(\alpha=0.01)$

[illegible] (9) [illegible] (0.616) [illegible] (0.590) [illegible]

[illegible] (0.493) [illegible] (0.566) [illegible]
[illegible] (0.562) [illegible]
[illegible].

[illegible] (0.465) [illegible] (0.456) [illegible] (0.211) [illegible].

[illegible] 2.4

[illegible]:

[illegible] (Multicollinearity) [illegible] (Variance Inflation Factory) (VIF) [illegible] (Tolerance) [illegible] (Tolerance) [illegible] (10) [illegible] (VIF) [illegible]

(Normal Distributions) [illegible] (0.05) [illegible] (Skewness) [illegible]

[illegible] (10) [illegible] (1) [illegible]

(10) [illegible]

[illegible]

Skewness	Tolerance	VIF	[illegible]	
0.589	0.257	3.887	[illegible]	[illegible]
0.692	0.296	3.373	[illegible]	
0.473	0.466	2.147	[illegible]	
0.561	0.300	3.335	[illegible]	
0.579	0.661	1.513	[illegible]	[illegible]
0.664	0.420	2.382	[illegible]	
0.427	0.447	2.238	[illegible]	
0.488	0.454	2.202	[illegible]	
0.275	0.446	2.244	[illegible]	
0.209	0.521	3.417	[illegible]	

[illegible] (VIF) [illegible] (3.887 - 2.147) [illegible] 10 [illegible] (3.417 - 1.513) [illegible] (Tolerance) [illegible] (0.661 - 0.153) [illegible] (0.466 - 0.257) [illegible] (Multicollinearity) [illegible] (Skewness) [illegible] (1) [illegible] (Analysis Of variance)

(11) [illegible]

[illegible] (Analysis Of variance) [illegible]

[illegible]

[illegible] F	F [illegible]	[illegible] (R^2)	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]
0.000	287.26	0.386	70.975	283.899	4	[illegible]	[illegible]
			0.247	451.112	1826	[illegible]	
				735.010	1830	[illegible]	
0.000	123.85	0.289	35.461	212.769	6	[illegible]	[illegible]
			0.286	522.241	1824	[illegible]	
				735.010	1830	[illegible]	

* [illegible] $(\alpha \leq 0.05)$

[illegible] (11) [illegible] (F) [illegible] (123.85) [illegible] (287.26) [illegible] (1824 [illegible] 6) [illegible] (1826 [illegible] 4) [illegible] $(\alpha \leq 0.05)$ [illegible] (%38.6) [illegible] (%28.9) [illegible].

[illegible] (α≤0.05) [illegible]

(12) [illegible]

[illegible]	[illegible]	Beta	[illegible]	B	[illegible]
0.000	*7.223	0.261	0.027	0.197	[illegible]
0.000	*5.114	0.172	0.022	0.114	[illegible]
0.001	*3.431	0.092	0.017	0.058	[illegible]
0.000	* 4.745	0.159	0.025	0.117	[illegible]

(α ≤ 0.05) [illegible] *

[illegible] (12) [illegible] (t) [illegible] (Beta) [illegible] 0.092 [illegible] 0.172 [illegible] 0.261) [illegible] (Beta) [illegible] 7.223) [illegible] (t) [illegible] (0.159 [illegible] 4.745 [illegible] 3.431 [illegible] 5.114 [illegible] α ≤ 0.05) [illegible] (α ≤ 0.05) [illegible]

[illegible] (α ≤ 0.05) [illegible]

[illegible]

(13) [illegible]

[illegible]

[illegible]	[illegible]	Beta	[illegible]	B	[illegible]
0.001	*3.229	0.078	0.015	0.049	[illegible]
0.000	*3.892	0.119	0.021	0.083	[illegible]
0.000	*7.187	0.212	0.022	0.157	[illegible]
0.000	*6.736	0.197	0.019	0.125	[illegible]
0.000	*7.846	0.232	0.018	0.141	[illegible]
0.000	* 6.018	0.220	0.029	0.177	[illegible]

(α ≤ 0.05) [illegible] *

[illegible] (13) [illegible] (t) [illegible] (Beta) [illegible] (Beta) [illegible] (t) [illegible] (0.177 [illegible] 0.141 [illegible] 0.125 [illegible] 0.157 [illegible] 0.083 [illegible] 0.049) [illegible] 6.736 [illegible] 7.187 [illegible] 3.892 [illegible] 3.229) [illegible] (α ≤ 0.05) [illegible] (6.018 [illegible] 7.846 [illegible]

[illegible] ($\alpha \leq 0.05$) [illegible]

[illegible]

[illegible] ($\alpha \leq 0.05$) [illegible]

(14) [illegible]

[illegible]

[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]
0.000	*19.14	8,395 0.439	25,184 801,27	(1827 3)	[illegible] [illegible]	[illegible]
0.000	*25.78	11,187 0.434	33,561 792,89	(1827 3)	[illegible] [illegible]	[illegible]
0.000	*8.78	3,93 0.45	7,86 818,59	(1828 2)	[illegible] [illegible]	[illegible]
0.000	*61.20	25,154 0.411	75,463 750,99	(1827 3)	[illegible] [illegible]	[illegible]
0.000	*13.67	6.131 0.449	6.131 820.32	(1829 1)	[illegible] [illegible]	[illegible]
0.000	*7.81	3.490 0.45	10.47 815.98	(1827 3)	[illegible] [illegible]	[illegible]

• [illegible] ($\alpha \leq 0.05$)

[illegible]

One Way [illegible] (14) [illegible]

[illegible] (Anova [illegible] ($\alpha = 0.000$) [illegible] (F= 19.14) [illegible]

[illegible] ($\alpha \leq 0.05$) [illegible]

[illegible] .(15) [illegible]

(15) [illegible]

[illegible]

[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]
-	-	-	-	3,12	[illegible]
-	-	-	*0.25	2,87	[illegible]
-	-	-	*0.41	2,71	[illegible]
-	-	-	*0.45	2,67	[illegible]

($\alpha \leq 0.05$) [illegible]*

[illegible] (3.12) [illegible] (2.87) [illegible] (2.67) [illegible].

[illegible]

[illegible] (14) [illegible] (One Way Anova) [illegible] (α=0.000) [illegible] (F=25.78) [illegible] ($\alpha \leq 0.05$) [illegible] (16) [illegible].

(16) [illegible]

[illegible]

[illegible] 16 [illegible]	[illegible] 15-11	10-6 [illegible]	[illegible] 5 [illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]
*0.22	*0.27	*0.18	-	2,64	[illegible] 5
*0.40	-	-	-	2,82	[illegible] 10-6
-	-	-	-	2.91	[illegible] 15-11
-	-	-	-	3,04	[illegible] 16

($\alpha \leq 0.05$) [illegible]*

[illegible] 16) [illegible] 16) [illegible] 5) [illegible] 10-6) [illegible] 16) [illegible] 15-11) [illegible] 16) [illegible] 15-11) [illegible] 5) [illegible] 5) [illegible] 10-6) [illegible] (14) [illegible] 10-6) [illegible] (3.04) [illegible] 16) [illegible]

(2.82) ... (2.91) (15- 11)

(2.64) ...

(One Way Anova) ...

(14) ...

(α=0.000) ... (F=8.78) ...

(α ≤ 0.05) ...

(17) ...

(17)

[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]
*0.24	-	-	2,78	[illegible]
*0.20	-	-	2,82	[illegible]
-	-	-	3,02	[illegible]

(α ≤ 0.05) ... *

(17) ...

(3.02) ...

(2.78) ... (2.82) ...

[illegible]

[illegible] (14) [illegible] (α = 0.000) [illegible] (F = 61.20) [illegible] (α ≤ 0.05) [illegible] (18).

(18) [illegible]

[illegible]

[illegible] 51	50-41 [illegible]	40-31 [illegible]	[illegible] 30 [illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]
*0.76	-	-	-	2.70	[illegible] 30
*0.64	-	-	-	2,82	[illegible] 40-31
*0.62	-	-	-	2,84	[illegible] 50-41
-	-	-	-	3,46	[illegible] 51

(α ≤ 0.05) [illegible]*

[illegible] 51) [illegible] (51 [illegible]) [illegible] (30 [illegible]) [illegible] (40-31 [illegible]) [illegible] (51 [illegible]) [illegible] (51 [illegible]) [illegible] 51) [illegible] (50-41 [illegible]) [illegible] (51 [illegible]) [illegible] 50-41) [illegible] (30 [illegible]) [illegible] (50-41 [illegible]) [illegible] (18) [illegible] (3.46) [illegible] 51) [illegible]

(2.70) [illegible] (2.84) [illegible]

[illegible]

[illegible]

(One Way ANOVA) [illegible] (14) [illegible]

[illegible] (F=13.67) [illegible]

($\alpha \leq 0.05$) [illegible] (α=0.000) [illegible]

[illegible] (19) [illegible] (2.85) [illegible]

(2.68) [illegible].

(19) [illegible]

[illegible]

[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]
0.69	2.85	254	[illegible]	[illegible]
0.67	2.68	1577	[illegible]	

[illegible]

[illegible] (14) [illegible]

[illegible] (One Way ANOVA) [illegible]

[illegible] (F=7.81) [illegible]

($\alpha \leq 0.05$) [illegible] (α=0.000)

[illegible] (20) [illegible].

(20) ĐŽ ýĂŋ!ƒ

ƨĮĂơ!ƒ ĐĵŽP Ŗ ƒ ŎĿ ĿĵĂơlŭŽ ýPƥ KƓĦ NĵT ƧƓƥƒ ýĐƃŽ NƑƓĵ

ĿĵŽƧ ŦD ýĠŽ 16000	- 9001 16000	- 6001 9000	ýĠŽ 6000 ýƿĿ	ƱĮ ĂƙŽ ŎĦƥơ!ƒ	ýPƥƒ KƓĦ
*0.27	-	-	-	2.79	ýƿĿ ýĠŽ 6000
*0.26	-	-	-	2.80	9000- 6001
-	-	-	-	2.87	16000- 9001
-	-	-	-	3.06	ýĠŽ16000 ĿĵŽƧ ŦD

(α ≤ 0.05) ăĂŖ dŽŽ ŧĵƑ ơƍŧ!Ŭƥ KƒŖ*

ĿĵŽƧ ŦD ýPƥƒ ŧĴ ĿĵƞŧĵƑ ơƍŧ!Ŭƥ KƒŖ ƫĂƧĿ ƥĂƞĂ Ĭ !ƍ ýĂŋ!ƒ ƧŎT ŏ 16000 ĿĵŽƧ ŦD ýPƥƒ ŧĴ ƠƓ !Ă (ýƿĿ ýĠŽ 6000) ŧĴƒĂ (ýĠŽ 16000 (ýĠŽ 16000 ĿĵŽƧ ŦD ýPƥƒ ŧĴ ĿĵƞŧĵƑ ơƍŧ!Ŭƥ KƒŖ ƫĂƧĿ ƥĂƞĂĂ .(ýĠŽ ĿĵŽƠ ƙĂ .(ýĠŽ 16000 ĿĵŽƧ ŦD ýPƥƒ ŧĴ ƠƓ !Ă (9000- 6001) ŧĴƒĂ ŧ ŏơ Ü ƧƞƮ!ƒ ýPƥDŽŎĦơ!ƒ KƓƱ ĂƙŽ ŎĿŧĵƑ ơŬƒ ƫĂƧĮƒ (20) ĐŽ ýĂŋ!ƒ ŬƞƧƥ (3.06) ƩĐŽ ýĠŽ 16000 ĿĵŽƧ ŦD ĭ ƧƞƮ!ƒ ýPƥDŽŎĦơ!ƒ ƱĮ ĂƙŽ ŇD .ŧƞƧƥ (2.79)Ăŧ ƞƧƥ (2.87)ĿĵƞƓƒƱ ĂƙŽ ĐĂƒƧƙ ă ƧPŬƒ ýPƥƒ KƓĦ ƓŽƲ

[illegible] ($\alpha \leq 0.05$) [illegible]

(21) [illegible]

[illegible]

[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]
0.000	*11.75	4.64 0.40	13.914 721.10	(1827 ، 3)	[illegible] [illegible]	[illegible]
0.000	*10.77	4.26 0.40	12.769 722.24	(1827 ، 3)	[illegible] [illegible]	[illegible]
0.001	6.70	2.67 0.40	5.35 729.66	(1828 ، 2)	[illegible] [illegible]	[illegible]
0.000	*9.30	3.69 0.40	11.06 723.95	(1827 ، 3)	[illegible] [illegible]	[illegible]
0.200	1.65	0.66 0.40	0.66 734.35	(1829 ، 1)	[illegible] [illegible]	[illegible]
0.002	*4.92	1.96 0.40	5.89 729.13	(1827 ، 3)	[illegible] [illegible]	[illegible]

* [illegible] ($\alpha \leq 0.05$)

[illegible]

[illegible] (21) [illegible] (One Way ANOVA) [illegible] (α=0.000) [illegible] (F=11.75) [illegible] ($\alpha \leq 0.05$) [illegible] (22).

(22) [illegible]

[illegible]

[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]
-	-	-	-	4.08	[illegible]
-	-	-	-	3.98	[illegible]
-	-	-	-	3.97	[illegible]
-	*0.25	*0.26	*0.36	3.72	[illegible]

(α ≤ 0.05) [illegible]*

[illegible] (3.72) [illegible] (3.98) [illegible] (4.08) [illegible].

[illegible]

[illegible] (21) [illegible] (One Way ANOVA) [illegible] (α=0.000) [illegible] (F=10.77) [illegible] (α ≤ 0.05) [illegible] (23) [illegible].

(23) [illegible]

[illegible]

16 [illegible]	15-11 [illegible]	10-6 [illegible]	5 [illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]
*0.27	-	-	-	3.87	[illegible] 5
*0.22	-	-	-	3.92	[illegible] 10-6
*0.20	-	-	-	3.94	[illegible] 15-11
-	-	-	-	4.14	[illegible] 16

($\alpha \leq 0.05$) [illegible]*

[illegible] 16) [illegible] (16 [illegible]) [illegible] (5 [illegible]) [illegible] (10-6 [illegible]) [illegible] (16 [illegible]) [illegible] 16) [illegible] (16 [illegible]) [illegible] (16 [illegible]) [illegible] (15-11 [illegible]) [illegible] (23) [illegible] (4.14) [illegible] (16 [illegible]) [illegible] (3.94) (15-11 [illegible]) [illegible] (3.87) [illegible] (3.92) [illegible].

[illegible]

[illegible] (21) [illegible] (One Way ANOVA) [illegible] (α=0.001) [illegible] (F=6.70) [illegible] ($\alpha \leq 0.05$) [illegible] (24) [illegible].

(24) [illegible]

[illegible]

[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]
*0.19	-	-	3.93	[illegible]
*0.18	-	-	3.94	[illegible]
-	-	-	4.12	[illegible]

[illegible] ($\alpha \leq 0.05$) *

[illegible] (24) [illegible] (4.12) [illegible] (3.94) [illegible] (3.93) [illegible].

[illegible]

[illegible] (21) [illegible] (One Way ANOVA) [illegible] (F=9.30) [illegible] (α=0.000) [illegible] ($\alpha \leq 0.05$) [illegible] (25) [illegible].

(25) [illegible]

[illegible]

[illegible] 51	50-41 [illegible]	40-31 [illegible]	[illegible] 30 [illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]
*0.21	*0.19	-	-	3.80	[illegible] 30
-	-	-	-	3.90	[illegible] 40-31
-	-	-	-	3.99	[illegible] 50-41
-	-	-	-	4.01	[illegible] 51

($\alpha \leq 0.05$) [illegible]*

[illegible] 51) [illegible] .([illegible] 51) [illegible] ([illegible] 30) [illegible] ([illegible] 30) [illegible] (50-41 [illegible]) [illegible] (25) [illegible] .([illegible] 50-41) [illegible] 51) [illegible] (3.99) ([illegible] 50-41) [illegible] (4.01) [illegible] (3.90) [illegible] (3.80) [illegible].

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[illegible] (One Way ANOVA) [illegible] (21) [illegible] (F=1.65) [illegible] (α=0.200) [illegible] ($\alpha \leq 0.05$) [illegible] (26) [illegible] (3.99) [illegible] (3.95).

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0.62	3.99	254	[illegible]	[illegible]
0.64	3.95	1577	[illegible]	

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[illegible] (21) [illegible] (One Way ANOVA) [illegible] (α=0.002) [illegible] (F=4.92) [illegible] (α ≤ 0.05) [illegible] (27) [illegible]

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[illegible] 16000 [illegible]	9001 - 16000	6001 - 9000	6000 [illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]
*0.24	-	-	-	3.85	[illegible] 6000
*0.17	-	-	-	3.92	6001 -9000
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1- الحوافز المادية

م	الفقرة	تنطبق دائماً	تنطبق غالباً	تنطبق إحياناً	تنطبق نادراً	لا تنطبق إطلاقاً
1	يوجد لدي رضا عن مستوى الحوافز المادية الممنوحة للعاملين من قبل شركة الاتصالات السعودية.					
2	تنعكس نتائج تقييم المدير لأدائي فعلياً عبر معطيات مادية ملموسة .					
3	تقدم شركة الاتصالات السعودية حوافز مادية لموظفيها بشكل مستمر.					
4	فرص الترقية المتاحة لي تحفزني على تحسين مستوى أدائي .					
5	تعتمد شركة الاتصالات السعودية الكفاءة كأساس في الترقية الأمر الذي اثر على تحسين مستوى أدائي .					
6	تقدم شركة الاتصالات السعودية مكافآت مختلفة مما يدفعني الى تحسين مستوى أدائي .					
7	ساهمت المكافآت العينية الممنوحة للمتميزين في شركة الاتصالات السعودية بأحداث تطور هام في مجال المنافسة بين العاملين .					
8	يرتبط أدائي بارتفاع قيمة المكافآت العينية الممنوحة لي.					
9	تطبق الشركة برامج ترفيهية جيدة للعاملين					
10	يغطي الأجر الذي أحصل عليه متطلباتي المعيشية.					
11	الأجر الذي اتقاضاه أقل مما يتقاضاه غيري في الشركات المنافسة الأخرى مما يترك أثراً سلبياً على أدائي .					

2-الحوافز المعنوية :

م	الفقرة	تنطبق دائماً	تنطبق غالباً	تنطبق إحياناً	تنطبق نادراً	لا تنطبق إطلاقاً
12	يساعدني توافر الوسائل المتطورة في العمل على اداء مهام وظيفتي بيسر.					
13	تتناسب وسائل الراحة المصاحبة لعملي مع الأوضاع الإنسانية.					
14	أسهم وجود نظم اتصالات فعال في تحسين مستوى ادائي في عملي .					
15	توفر المعلومات أسهم في تحسين مستوى ادائي في عملي .					
16	وجود قنوات اتصال مفتوحة مابين الرئيس والمرؤوسين لعرض مشاكل العمل على الرؤساء أسهم في تحسين مستوى ادائي في عملي .					
17	تتناسب جميع المسؤليات الملقاة على عاتقي مع قدراتي في العمل .					
18	سيادة روح الأخاء والصداقة أسهم في تحسين مستوى أدائي .					
19	هنالك فرص للترقية في عملي باستمرار .					
20	يتيح لي جو العمل السائد بناء علاقات وظيفية مع الزملاء في العمل.					
21	توجد امكانية تعلم الطرق السليمة للاداء الفعال .					
22	تتسم اللوائح والتعليمات الموجودة في شركة الاتصالات السعودية بالمرونة .					
23	يسمح لي نظام العمل المتبع في الشركة بالمشاركة في اتخاذ القرارات .					
24	لا توجد قيود بيروقراطية صارمة مفروضة على أدائي لواجباتي .					
25	هناك فرص متكافئة لجميع العاملين في الشركة لحضور الدورات التدريبية.					
26	يشجعني رؤسائي على تطبيق المهارات المكتسبة من الدورات التدريبية في العمل .					

3- الحوافز السلبية والايجابية :

م	الفقرة	تنطبق دائماً	تنطبق غالباً	تنطبق إحياناً	تنطبق نادراً	لا تنطبق اطلاقاً
27	هناك احترام للقوانين والتعليمات التي تنظم طبيعة عملي .					
28	أهداف عملي تحدد لي إطار المسؤولية بشكل دقيق .					
29	لا أمتنع عندما أكلف بمهام وظيفة أخرى .					
30	لدي القدرة على مواجهة الصعوبات والعقبات التي تواجهني أثناء العمل .					
31	أتصرف بمنتهى الشعور بالمسئولية عند حل المشاكل التي قد تحدث في عملي					
32	تقدر شركة الاتصالات السعودية جهود العاملين المتميزين عن طريق عرض أسمائهم على لوحة الشرف مما ينعكس إيجابا على الأداء .					
33	أحصل على احترام وتقدير زملائي عندما أجيد أدائي لعملي .					
34	عندما أنجز عمل ما جيداً واحصل على شكر رؤسائي فان ذلك يزيد من تحسين أدائي في العمل .					
35	تضمن شركة الاتصالات السعودية لي مستقبلاً جيداً .					
36	يوجد نظام ثابت ومحدد لمنح المكافآت والعلاوات .					
37	المنافسة بين العاملين في شركة الاتصالات السعودية له اثر ايجابي على تحسين الأداء.					
38	أشعر بأن المردود المادي الإيجابي هو المسئول الأول عن الإبداع والعطاء في مجال عملي.					
39	أعمل باستمرار على تجاوز الحالات السلبية التي تواجه عملي .					
40	إن وجود نظم الحوافز السلبية من توبيخ او بحسم مبلغ معين من الراتب او تهديد بالطرد له أثر إيجابي على أدائي .					

4- الحوافز الفردية والجماعية :

م	الفقرة	تنطبق دائماً	تنطبق غالباً	تنطبق إحياناً	تنطبق نادراً	لا تنطبق إطلاقاً
41	علاقتي الجيدة مع رئيسي المباشر تحسن من مستوى أدائي .					
42	أحاول تقديم أفكار عديدة لتحسين من مستوى أدائي .					
43	إن طبيعة عملي ومهنتي توفر لي مركزاً اجتماعياً مرموقاً.					
44	تخبرني شركة الاتصالات السعودية عن خططها ومشاريعها المستقبلية.					
45	أشعر بمعنويات عالية في العمل تحفزني نحو الإبداع .					
46	أسعى لأكون نموذجاً وقدوة في أدائي لعملي .					
47	إن شهادات التقدير التي تعتمدها شركة الاتصالات السعودية يمكن إن توفر مجالاً رحباً لزيادة الإنتاجية وتحسين الأداء.					
48	إن ربط الحوافز بالإنتاج يؤثر إيجابياً على تحسين مستوى ادائي .					
49	إن لتخصيص شركة الاتصالات السعودية مكافأة للعامل الذي يحسن أنتاجه كما ونوعاً اثراً على تحسين مستوى أدائي .					
50	إن لمنح العامل نسبة من الأرباح المتحصلة شركة الاتصالات السعودية أثر في تحسين مستوى أدائي.					
51	أفضل العمل في الشركات التي توفر ساعات عمل إضافية.					
52	لا يهمني مستوى الأداء الذي أنجزه ما دامت الحوافز تمنح للجميع .					

القسم الثالث :الأداء الوظيفي

م	الفقرة	تنطبق دائماً	تنطبق غالباً	تنطبق إحياناً	تنطبق نادراً	لا تنطبق إطلاقاً
53	اتميز بأن عملي في شركة الاتصالات السعودية يتصف بالدقة .					
54	اعمل باستمرار على تنفيذ التعليمات بدقة .					
55	أسعى إلى الإطلاع على الأدبيات المرتبطة بموضوع ومجالات عملي .					
56	أشعر بالسعادة حينما أؤدي عملي بدقة .					
57	أقيم نفسي باستمرار من خلال رضا المسؤولين عني وظيفياً .					
58	أرغب بالبحث والتقصي عن الأفكار الجديدة في مجال مهنتي.					
59	أتابع باستمرار ما يواكب التطور الحاصل في مجال تخصصي الوظيفي لغرض تحسين أدائي.					
60	نادراً ما أرتكب الأخطاء أثناء أدائي لعملي في شركة الاتصالات السعودية.					
61	علاقتي بزملائي في العمل علاقة طيبة وحسنة .					
62	إن أدائي في الشركة التي أعمل بها لا يختلف كثيراً عن المعايير الموضوعية.					
63	أطلب دائماً عمل أو مسؤوليات إضافية على العمل المطلوب مني الشركة التي أعمل بها.					